Authors
Samir Chopra
Brooklyn College (CUNY)
Abstract
Thinking about how the law might decide whether to extend legal personhood to artificial agents provides a valuable testbed for philosophical theories of mind. Further, philosophical and legal theorising about personhood for artificial agents can be mutually informing. We investigate two case studies, drawing on legal discussions of the status of artificial agents. The first looks at the doctrinal difficulties presented by the contracts entered into by artificial agents. We conclude that it is not necessary or desirable to postulate artificial agents as legal persons in order to account for such contracts. The second looks at the potential for according sophisticated artificial agents with legal personality with attendant constitutional protections similar to those accorded to humans. We investigate the validity of attributes that have been suggested as pointers of personhood, and conclude that they will take their place within a broader matrix of pragmatic, philosophical and extra-legal concepts.
Keywords artificial agent  personhood  legal personality  moral status
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References found in this work BETA

Intelligence Without Representation.Rodney A. Brooks - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 47 (1--3):139-159.
Quining Qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental.Richard Rorty - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (June):399-424.
Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences.Lawrence B. Solum - 1992 - North Carolina Law Review 70:1231.
The Case for Rorts.Daniel C. Dennett - 2000 - In R.B. Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics. Blackwell.

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Robots of Just War: A Legal Perspective.Ugo Pagallo - 2011 - Philosophy and Technology 24 (3):307-323.

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