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Can Artificial Systems Be Part of a Collective Action?
In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 205-218 (1st ed. 2015)
Abstract
To answer the question of whether artificial systems may count as agents in a collective action, I will argue that a collective action is a special kind of an action and show that the sufficient conditions for playing an active part in a collective action differ from those required for being an individual intentional agent.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Social Robotics and the Good Life: The Normative Side of Forming Emotional Bonds with Robots.Janina Loh & Wulf Loh (eds.) - 2022 - Transcript Verlag.
Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017.Vincent C. Müller (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: Springer.
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