Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-26 (2004)
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10.4288/jafpos1956.13.1

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The logic of scientific discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Hutchinson Publishing Group.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.

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