Evidential Relevance and the Grue Paradox

Kagaku Tetsugaku 31 (1):101-119 (1998)
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Abstract

use of the Hempelian instance confirmation relation, there are asymmetries than can be exploited if we adopt an "ontic" confirmation theory that uses a causal notion of evidential relevance. I sort out a variety of interpretive confusions about the intended content of the definition of grue and show how the causal approach resolves each in a way that is not paradoxical.

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