Abstract
Bayesians regard their solution to the paradox of confirmation as grounds for preferring their theory of confirmation to Hempel’s. They point out that, unlike Hempel, they can at least say that a black raven confirms “All ravens are black” more than a white shoe. However, I argue that this alleged advantage is cancelled out by the fact that Bayesians are equally committed to the view that a white shoe confirms “All non-black things are non-ravens” less than a black raven. In light of this, I reexamine the dialectic between Hempel and the Bayesians
Keywords Paradox of confirmation  Paradox of the ravens  Bayesianism  Carl Hempel
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DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0007-1
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Logic of Confirmation.Carl A. Hempel - 1983 - In Peter Achinstein (ed.), The Concept of Evidence. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-26.
The White Shoe is a Red Herring.I. J. Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):322.

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Citations of this work BETA

Bayesian Confirmation, Connexivism and an Unkindness of Ravens.Elisangela Ramirez - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):449-475.

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