Doxastic Self-Control

American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):145-58 (2015)
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Abstract

This paper discusses the possibility of autonomy in our epistemic lives, and the importance of the concept of the first person in weathering fluctuations in our epistemic perspective over time.

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Sarah Paul
New York University, Abu Dhabi

Citations of this work

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star, The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.
Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence.Lara Buchak - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):113-133.
Ought-contextualism and reasoning.Darren Bradley - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2977-2999.

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References found in this work

Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.
Willing, Wanting, Waiting.Richard Holton - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.

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