Abstract

In my paper, I reconstruct the basic features of the metaphysical conception of the world in László Tengelyi. I outline that he understands the world and its existence as a fact. In opposition to traditional ontology, Tengelyi believes that the fact of the world is of necessary. However, its necessity is not of logical a priori nature but conditioned by the concordance of experience. One ought to point out that the Tengelyi’s phenomenological metaphysics of the world is limited by the realm of experience. Following Husserl, he treats the world as the universal horizon of the experience. This is the horizon in which a thing can appear as limitless system of gradations. I analyze also the Tengelyi’s concept ‘project of world’ and explore two ‘projects’ of such a kind pointed in his metaphysics, namely (1) metontological transcendentalism and (2) naturalistic autarchism. I pay a special attention to the Tengelyi’s concept of the infinitude as a basic characteristic of the world. He considers it as the openness to the generation of the absolute new qualities of the things in the world.