Abstract

Laszlo Tengelyi’s phenomenological project, as presented in his book “World and infinity. To the problem of the phenomenological metaphysics”, published posthumously, is founded on the idea of the infinity of the world. In rehabilitating the husserlian thesis of the infinity as constitutive feature of the worldly experience, Tengelyi departs from the phenomenology of the finitude, which goes back to Heidegger. The article analyzes the origins of the infinity/finitude dilemma in transcendental phenomenology of the world in Husserl, Heidegger and Tengelyi. It demonstrates that the dilemma is rooted in the ambiguity of the phenomenological concept of transcendence. On the one hand, the transcendence is interpreted as the essential openness of the experience, which renders it infinite. On the other hand, the openness is constituted by horizon as the finitude of the experience.