Bias and interpersonal skepticism

Noûs 56 (1):154-175 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent philosophy has paid considerable attention to the way our biases are liable to encroach upon our cognitive lives, diminishing our capacity to know and unjustly denigrating the knowledge of others. The extent of the bias, and the range of domains to which it applies, has struck some as so great as to license talk of a new form of skepticism. I argue that these depressing consequences are real and, in some ways, even more intractable than has previously been recognized. For the difficulties we face in this domain are fueled not only by implicit biases but by various other sorts of entrenched cognitive attitudes we bear toward others, whether or not we judge them to be our peers. Inasmuch as the epistemic standing of this broader set of attitudes is itself quite dubious, the problem of epistemic injustice turns out to be just one special case—albeit of a particularly nasty kind—from a broader domain of cases where the collaborative character of knowledge clashes with tendencies that make collaboration difficult. This makes the threat of skepticism all the greater, and at the same time makes it harder to see what path of escape there might be.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,491

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Exuberant skepticism.Paul Kurtz - 2010 - Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. Edited by John R. Shook.
Overcoming contradiction in the four-dimensional dialectic of action.Hendrika Vande Kemp - 2009 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):85-90.
1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):271-290.
Rethinking prestige bias.Azita Chellappoo - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8191-8212.
Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation.Michael Hannon - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge.
Skepticism as Vice and Virtue.Pierre Le Morvan - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (3):238-260.
1% Skepticism.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4).
The impossibility of local skepticism.Stephen Maitzen - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (4):453-464.
Skepticism: Impractical, Therefore Implausible.Michael Hannon - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):143-158.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-09-04

Downloads
112 (#143,618)

6 months
10 (#132,758)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Pasnau
University of Colorado, Boulder

Citations of this work

Epistemic justice and experiential self.V. Hari Narayanan - 2023 - Mind and Society 22 (1):67-85.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.
Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.Kristie Dotson - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):115-138.
White Ignorance.Charles W. Mills - 2007 - In Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana (eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance. Albany, NY: State Univ of New York Pr. pp. 11-38.

View all 49 references / Add more references