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Morality, self-interest, and reasons for being moral
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (4):493-507 (1984)
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Citations of this work
Preference satisfaction and welfare economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-25.
Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration.David Sobel - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):249.
Hausman and McPherson on welfare economics and preference satisfaction theories of welfare: A critical note.Alexander F. Sarch - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (1):141-159.
Extended preferences and interpersonal comparisons: A new account.Matthew D. Adler - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (2):123-162.
Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “why be moral?”.John J. Tilley - 2008 - Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323.
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