Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration

Economics and Philosophy 14 (2):249 (1998)
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Abstract

The proposal I offer attempts to remedy the inadequacies of exclusive focus on well-being for moral purposes. The proposal is this: We should allow the agent to decide for herself where she wants to throw the weight that is her due in moral reflection, with the proviso that she understands the way that her weight will be aggregated with others in reaching a moral outcome. I will call this the "autonomy principle." The autonomy principle, I claim, provides the consequentialist's best prospect for taking people into account morally in a way that they endorse

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David Sobel
Syracuse University

Citations of this work

Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Subjectivism without Desire.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.
Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being?Daniel M. Haybron & Valerie Tiberius - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):712--733.
Preference satisfaction and welfare economics.Daniel M. Hausman - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-25.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Taking rights seriously.Ronald Dworkin (ed.) - 1977 - London: Duckworth.
Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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