Abstract

This paper is part of an ongoing research project and builds upon a previous one in which we explain the failure of the Agency Theory through the Shell case. In that, we analysed the behaviour of Shell managers, who reclassified oil reserves, playing with the share price because they owned share options. This previous paper established an important literature framework that is continued and organized to go deeper into our analysis in this paper. The goal here is to show that the way that is supposed to be the right tool to inform stakeholders – disclosure – is not enough, and even in the Shell case, no one would have noticed the problems with the oil reserves through the mere analysis of the company disclosure during the ‘strange period’ (1998–2003). The methodology used in this paper is lexical analysis, which seems to be an innovative and effective approach to the analysis of Corporate Social Disclosure, given the un‐codified nature of the latter. The conclusions obtained highlight the problem of lack of transparency in the contents of corporate social disclosure: some firms avoid communicating crucial contents, some others twist the results in order to camouflage advantages to shareholders or managers. If it is like this for disclosing firms, what is happening in the case of non‐disclosing firms?