Michael Oberst
Humboldt-University, Berlin (PhD)
Kant’s doctrine of the “transcendental object” has always puzzled interpreters. On the one hand, he says that the transcendental object is the object to which we relate our representations. On the other hand, he declares the transcendental object to be unknowable and identifies it with the thing in itself. I argue that this poses a problem that Kant only in the B edition of the Critique solves in a satisfactory manner. According to this solution, we ascribe sensible predicates to things in themselves, but only insofar as they appear. I conclude that this could motivate a phenomenalist account of Kant’s idealism, but one that gives due weight to the role of things in themselves.
Keywords Kant  Transcendental Object
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The Transcendental Object.Donald R. Dunbar - 1975 - Idealistic Studies 5 (2):127-138.
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