Abstract

The traditional picture of psychological explanation is that mental states cause behavior and that explanations which cite these states are causal in character. This venerable position is now being challenged by the recognition that content-bearing mental states are sensitive to external factors in such a way that they might vary across physically identical individuals. A number of philosophers have argued that if an explanatory schema is causal then it must classify explanatory states as the same just in case they share the same causal powers. Some philosophers have also argued that mental states of physically identical individuals must agree in causal powers, leading them to conclude that psychological explanation cannot be causal if externalism if true. Other philosophers have tried to reconcile externalism with causality by maintaining that physically identical individuals may differ in their psychologically relevant causal powers. ;I advance an unexplored way of reconciling externalism with the causality of psychological explanation. Specifically, I question the fundamental assumption that causal explanation requires mental states to be individuated according to their causal powers. This assumption is backed by the presupposition that psychological explanations are offered by appealing to a psychological theory. In an attempt to avoid the principle connecting individuation with causal powers, I examine simulation theory, an alternative account of psychological explanation. According to simulation theory, we explain an individual's behavior by simulating the mental states of that person and running our own cognitive systems "off-line." Similarly, we attribute mental states to another person by imagining ourselves in her position and seeing what mental states our own cognitive systems would generate under those circumstances. ;Given the framework of simulation theory, I argue that individuals may give causal explanations of behavior by envisioning various counterfactual situations within the context of a simulation. I also argue that a simulation-theoretic account of mental state ascription can accommodate context dependence. I conclude that if simulation theory is a viable account of psychological explanation, then causal explanation need not require individuation according to causal powers, and psychological explanation may be causal in the face of externalism