Alzheimer's disease and socially extended mentation

Metaphilosophy 40 (3-4):462-474 (2009)
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The leading accounts of the ethics of proxy decision making implicitly draw on internalist conceptions of the philosophy of mind, or so this essay tries to demonstrate. Using the views of Ronald Dworkin as its jumping‐off point, the essay argues that accepting the sort of externalism associated with writers such as Putnam and Burge would alter Dworkin's conclusions concerning how we should respond to the current or precedent decisions of people suffering from dementia. Building on the views of Agnieszka Jawarska, it argues that accepting “active” externalism à la Clark and Chambers would provide currently competent people with new resources for establishing the authority of their present values over inconsistent values they might come to entertain should they become demented.



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Jamie Nelson
Michigan State University

References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa (eds.) - 2008 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.

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