Value in Nature: Grounding Our Moral Obligations

Dissertation, University of Georgia (1997)
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Abstract

In this work, I defend an ethical framework intended to guide individual behavior and public policy decisions in a way that recognizes the many diverse values present in the natural environment in which we live. In my view, ethical theory is properly concerned with providing principles or norms of right action, where the essence of right action is the promotion of value. On this conception of ethics, a great deal of importance is placed on axiological claims detailing what sorts of things have value. The heart of this dissertation consists of an argument in defense of what I call an emotometric theory of value. I argue that all of the diverse varieties of value in the world are ultimately based on the value-laden emotional experiences of beings capable of affective response. This does not mean that elements in nature which do not experience an emotional life have no value. However, I argue that there are important distinctions to be made between the value possessed by experiencing beings who are the ultimate sources of all value and the value possessed by other entities in nature. In order to clarify these differences, I distinguish several different types of value: extrinsic, intrinsic, inherent and instrumental. ;I reject both radically anthropocentric views which assert that all value is attributable to human beings, and views which discount or ignore the importance of emotional experience, human and otherwise, in assessing what is of value. I spend some time investigating the broadly empirical question of what sorts of individuals are capable of emotional experience and thereby qualify as sources of vaIue according to the emotometric theory that I defend. I argue that many non-human animals have a capacity for morally significant experience, and that this capacity exists on a continuum. From this, I infer that the experiences and lives of some individuals are of greater intrinsic value than others. I then provide an outline showing how we can sensibly compare the value associated with different experiences in different individuals

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Warren Neill
Carleton University

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