I am looking at an apple. The apple has a lot of properties and some, but
not all, of these are part of my phenomenology at this moment: I am aware of these properties. And some, but not all, of these properties that I am aware of are part of my perceptual (or sensory) phenomenology. If I am attending to the apple’s color, this property will be part of my perceptual phenomenology. The property of being a granny smith apple from Chile is unlikely to be part of my perceptual phenomenology.
Here are two problems for anyone who is interested in conscious experience
in general, and perceptual experience in particular:
(a) How can we tell which properties are part of our phenomenology and
which ones are not?
(b) How can we tell which properties are part of our perceptual phenomenology and which ones are part of our non-perceptual phenomenology?
I will focus on (b) in this paper. My aim is twofold: I propose a methodology for answering the question of which properties are part of our perceptual phenomenology and I provide an example for how this methodology could be applied.