Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862 (2016)

Authors
Grace Helton
Princeton University
Abstract
Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high-level features, including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised). I clarify the claim that we perceive high-level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception-based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high-level perception and discuss some of the objections that have been raised against this strategy. Finally, I describe two emerging defenses of high-level perception, one of which appeals to a certain class of perceptual deficits and one of which appeals to adaptation effects. I sketch a challenge for the latter approach.
Keywords high-level perception  visual experience  phenomenal contrast method  perception-cognition divide  unilateral neglect  adaptation effects  gender perception  philosophy of action  feeling of familiarity  phenomenal unity
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1111/phc3.12383
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - 1953 - New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - Oxford University Press USA.
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.

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Citations of this work BETA

Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others.Grace Helton - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):243-264.
The Perception of Relations.Alon Hafri & Chaz Firestone - 2021 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 25 (6):475-492.
Moral Perception.Preston J. Werner - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1).

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

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