Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the (...) capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content/fixer of truth conditions. (shrink)

Contrary to Block's assertion, “identity-crowding” does not provide an interesting instance of object-seeing without object-attention. The successful judgments and unusual phenomenology of identity-crowding are better explained by unconscious perception and non-perceptual phenomenology associated with cognitive states. In identity-crowding, as in other cases of crowding, subjects see jumbled textures and cannot individuate the items contributing to those textures in the absence of attention. Block presents an attenuated sense in which identity-crowded items are seen, but this is irrelevant to the debate about (...) phenomenal experience of an object in the absence of object-attention. Finally, even unconscious object perception in identity-crowding likely involves an attention-like selective process. (shrink)

Can unattended objects by seen? Ned Block has claimed they can on the basis of “identity-crowding.” This paper summarizes the ensuing debate with particular emphasis on the role of unconscious perception. Although unconscious perception plays an important role, it cannot support conscious object-seeing in identity-crowding. Nevertheless, unconscious perception assists in making successful judgments about unseen objects. Further, compelling conceptual evidence against seeing unattended objects places the burden of proof on Block. I argue that countability is necessary for seeing objects and (...) sufficient for attention to them; thus, no unattended objects are seen. (shrink)

Introspective subjective reports cannot provide direct evidence that phenomenal experience overflows cognitive access. This problem for the overflow view is underappreciated in several ways: first, it places the onus on the overflow theorist to explain how sub-jective reports can be used to provide evidence for overflow. Second, it implies that there must be a true non-overflow account of subjective reports of overflow, even if there is overflow. Thus, attempting to dis-prove all anti- overflow explanations of subjective reports is futile. Third, (...) it follows that the focus of enquiry should be on unconscious processing and indirect measures of conscious awareness; this is the area where the debate may be advanced. Finally, employment of inadmissible subjective reports continues to undermine work by over-flow theorists like Bronfman et al. and Block. (shrink)

The consciousness of the hosts is a major theme in Westworld, and for good reason. Hosts are not philosophical zombies. The hosts act like they have feelings, like they suffer and fear, like they enjoy the yellow, pink, and blue tones of a beautiful sunset. This chapter examines the analogs of memory, perception, and emotion in hosts. Hosts have a very troubling relationship to memory. Although using a different visual style would denote unique host experience, using the same visual style (...) to depict both human and host experience is not a strong indicator that the hosts are conscious, or that they have similar experiences to humans. Host perception, memory, and emotions all seem different from human, but the cinematic medium does not grant us immediate access to host experience, and neither the testimony of the creators, nor the hosts is totally reliable. (shrink)

Poursuivant une idée discutée part Thomas Nagel, Rockney Jacobsen soutient que les désirs sexuels ont pour objets des activités que l’on croit affecter les états d’excitation sexuelle de certaines façons. Je soutiens que certains désirs sexuels ont plutôt pour objets des activités que l’on croit affecter les états d’attraction phénoménale. Contrairement à l’excitation sexuelle, l’attraction phénoménale ne peut être apaisée; il n’existe donc aucune activité qui puisse satisfaire les désirs sexuels phénoménaux basés sur l’attraction phénoménale. Cela explique pourquoi les activités (...) sexuelles sont si nombreuses et variées, et peut-être aussi comment autant d’activités sont en mesure d’affecter l’excitation sexuelle. (shrink)

In Be Right Back Martha's partner Ash is snatched away from her by an automobile accident. When, desperate and alone, she discovers that she is pregnant with Ash's child, she utilizes an emerging technology to bring him, or something like him, back. Would you replace your partner with a robotic likeness, maybe even make a few improvements? Should you?

Nanay has recently argued, on the basis of the cognitive penetrability of experience, that the attribution of aesthetically relevant properties supervenes on perceptual experience. I argue that this claim is false as stated and cannot be salvaged. I provide a series of thought experiments as counterexamples, showing that the title of an artwork can influence its ARPs, its meaning or value, and the accurate attributions of ARPs while the character of the perceptual experience of the piece remains constant. I introduce (...) the notions of context and appropriate context, and I argue that ARPs supervene on observable properties and appropriate contexts; there is no difference in ARPs without a difference in appropriate context or a difference in observable properties. Two paintings may share all of their observable properties and all of their context-relative perceptual properties but be ARP distinct, since each has a different appropriate context, and contexts are not usually determined or instant... (shrink)

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.