Killing and Relevantly Similarly Letting Die

Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):199-201 (1998)
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Winston Nesbitt has argued that the usual examples appealed to as supporting the view that killing is no worse than letting die are misleading in that the comparison cases are not set up properly to tap our intuitions. Making various adjustments to the cases he judges killing to be intuitively worse than letting die and suggests that such a result is meta‐ethically appropriate to one view of the point of ethics. I contest each of these claims.



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