Abstract

Definitions of disability are useful for different purposes and carry normative significance. However, defining disability has proven a difficult task. Communities with different theoretical backgrounds and practical aims disagree about how to define disability. Recently, Chong‐Ming Lim (2018) has attempted to define disability in a manner accommodating of the different interests and theoretical commitments of the disability and the medical communities. His account aims at broadening Elizabeth Barnes' (2016) definition of disability, which is not sufficiently inclusive of the interests of the medical community and leaves out cases other than physical disabilities. Under the most plausible interpretation of his account, however, the account becomes more restrictive than that of Barnes. In this paper, I propose instead two kinds of accounts: a disjunctive one based on a reinterpretation of Lim's, and a cluster concept account of disability. Both accounts can avoid the restrictiveness problem faced by Lim's and Barnes' original accounts.