Abstract
In this chapter I contend that Husserl’s investigations of reduction and givenness culminate in a hubris and a humility that are not precisely where Marion might look for them. In the first section of this essay I set out the main points in Marion’s reading of Husserl. I begin by outlining the broadening and breakthrough achieved in the early work, and then consider the shift that Marion sees presaged in the principle of all principles and announced in the reduction. On the latter’s interpretation, appearing things are reduced to objects within the intentional immanence of consciousness. This process culminates in poor and flat phenomena that are modelled on the mathematising horizons of the subject. I go on to give a short outline of Marion’s alternative notions of the interloqué and the saturated phenomenon. I commence the second section by looking briefly at what I call Husserl’s philosophical hubris, brought out in some of his remarks concerning the subjective a priori. Hubris lies in the interpretation of everything as a meaning for me, from God through to the world. It does not lie in the taking of beings as objects within fixed horizons, for Husserl shows a notable humility towards the things themselves in their respective appearances. Such humility is not a rarity, but is threaded through the explications that follow on the procedures of epoché and reduction. In the rest of this section, my concern is to show that, as Husserl’s thought develops, he pays ever more attention to the original modes of givenness of transcendent things. In the third and final section, I suggest that he also does justice to the character of the world as non-objective ground and horizon. Philosophical hubris will in no way preclude empirical humility.