Why Assertion and Practical Reasoning Must be Governed By the Same Epistemic Norm

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):57-68 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that assertion and practical reasoning must be governed by the same epistemic norm. This is because the epistemic rule governing assertion derives from the epistemic rule governing practical reasoning, together with a plausible rule regarding assertion, according to which assertion must manifest belief

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,672

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

In what sense is knowledge the Norm of assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
The status of the knowledge account of assertion.Frank Hindriks - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (3):393-406.
The Supportive Reasons Norm of Assertion.Rachel McKinnon - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2):121-135.
Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.
What Assertion Doesn't Show.Conor McHugh - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):407-429.
Assertion, practical reason, and pragmatic theories of knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.
Moorean Sentences and the Norm of Assertion.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (4):653-658.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-09-25

Downloads
84 (#199,827)

6 months
9 (#301,354)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Martin Montminy
University of Oklahoma

Citations of this work

The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions.Michael J. Hannon - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.
No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):231-238.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.

View all 16 references / Add more references