Synthese 189 (2):373-394 (2012)

Authors
Mikkel Gerken
University of Southern Denmark
Abstract
In this paper, I consider how a general epistemic norm of action that I have proposed in earlier work should be specified in order to govern certain types of acts: assertive speech acts. More specifically, I argue that the epistemic norm of assertion is structurally similar to the epistemic norm of action. First, I argue that the notion of warrant operative in the epistemic norm of a central type of assertion is an internalist one that I call ‘discursive justification.’ This type of warrant is internalist insofar as it requires that the agent is capable of articulating reasons for her belief. The idea, roughly, is that when one asserts that p, one is supposed to be in a position to give reasons for believing that p. Bonjour’s reliable clairvoyant Norman, for example, is not in an epistemic position to make assertions regarding the president’s whereabouts—even if Norman knows the president’s whereabouts. In conclusion, I briefly consider whether a type of skeptical argument—often labeled Agrippa’s Trilemma—is motivated, at least in part, by the fact that responses to it violate the relevant epistemic norm of assertion.
Keywords Norms of assertion  Skepticism  Discursive justification  Agrippa’s Trilemma  Epistemic warrant  Dogmatism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0076-0
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Charging Others With Epistemic Vice.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):181-197.

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