The Limits of Instrumental Proceduralism

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (1) (2022)
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Abstract

According to instrumental proceduralism, political power is justified when it is the output of a reliable procedure. In this paper, I examine how procedures are supposed to confer normative properties. Based on this assessment, I conclude that many proceduralists set the reliability bar too low. Next, I motivate two additional requirements for instrumental procedures. I introduce the notion of “predictable” procedural failure and argue that in order for a procedure to confer legitimacy or other normative properties on its output, it must not have failed predictably. Finally, I argue that even when procedures are highly reliable, it must not be the case that their failures fall disproportionately on certain people. The goal is to develop an instrumental proceduralism that is more sensitive to the failures of real institutions.

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Jake Monaghan
Chapman University

Citations of this work

Algorithmic legitimacy in clinical decision-making.Sune Holm - 2023 - Ethics and Information Technology 25 (3):1-10.

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References found in this work

Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Kantian constructivism in moral theory.John Rawls - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (9):515-572.
Conclusive reasons.Fred I. Dretske - 1971 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-22.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Justification and legitimacy.A. John Simmons - 1999 - Ethics 109 (4):739-771.

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