Too much substance, not enough cognition

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):80-80 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Millikan's account of substance concepts is based on a notion of “substance” expanded from realist notions of individuals and natural kinds. Her metaphysical notion, based on “inductive potential,” is shown to be too puristic and needs to incorporate cognizing subjects. This could preserve the realist/nondescriptionist insight that the extension of substances is determined by the world.

Similar books and articles

Etyka Spinozy a problem poznania transcendentalnego.Anna Tomaszewska - 2014 - Studia Z Historii Filozofii 4 (4):113-125.
Spinoza's Thinking Substance and the Necessity of Modes.Karolina Hübner - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):3-34.
Context and retrieval effects on implicit cognition for substance use.Marvin D. Krank & A. Wall - 2006 - In Reinout W. Wiers & Alan W. Stacy (eds.), Handbook of Implicit Cognition and Addiction. Sage Publications. pp. 281--292.
God as Substance without Substance Ontology.Wachter Daniel von - 2007 - In Christian Kanzian & Muhammed Legenhausen (eds.), Substance and Attribute: Western and Islamic Traditions in Dialogue. Ontos Verlag. pp. 237-245, http://epub.ub.uni-muen.
The Problem of Substance in Metaphysics.Kanu Ikechukwu Anthony - 2012 - African Research Review 1 (1):24-29.
Accidents Unmoored.John Heil - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):113-120.
Substance, attribute, and mode in Spinoza.Martin Lin - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):144–153.
A Defense of Substance Causation.Ann Whittle - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association (1):1-20.
Unity and Primary Substance for Aristotle.Catherine Jack Deavel - 2003 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 77:159-172.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
531 (#34,390)

6 months
116 (#35,499)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Vincent C. Müller
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references