What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?

In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-125 (2001)
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Abstract

"According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32)

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