Mentalese semantics and the naturalized mind

Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):77-94 (2004)
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Abstract

In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, that the ontological commitments of intentional psychology survive within a broader conception of naturalism than the one adopted by Fodor

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References found in this work

Information and representation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
Misinformation.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1989 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):533-50.
Naturalizing content.Paul Boghossian - 1990 - In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.

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