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Three Arguments from Science *for* Free Will
Abstract
I give three brief scientifically informed arguments that free will is causally efficacious over-and-above the efficaciousness of its physical substrate. (This is a second attempt at putting it up on PhilPapers--there seems to have been some problem with downloading the previous version.)Author's Profile
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Author's Profile
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
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