In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. MIT Press. pp. 417-425 (2014)

Manuel Vargas
University of California, San Diego
In “Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?” Al Mele extends his groundbreaking work on scientific arguments against free will. He replies to charges that he has missed the real threat to free will posed by experimental work, and he focuses on two issues: (1) the claim that the “real” threat of scientific work is bound up with substance dualism, and (2) recent work by Soon et al. that has been taken to show that some intentions can be predicted in advance
Keywords free will  sourcehood  science
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Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?Alfred Mele - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):422-440.

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