Abstract

This article presents a mutual critique of the analytic and phenomenological theory of action. The first perspective focuses on the standard approach introduced by G.E.M. Anscombe. According to Anscombe, actions are events that are intentional under a description. Consequently, the distinction between action and mere behavior depends on the linguistic description of behavior. However, this perspective fails to address the possible transitions between behavior and action. One way to fill this gap is by investigating the specific form of intentionality belonging to striving or tendency. Such an investigation can complement the standard theory of action by illuminating the realm in which volitional and intentional actions are formed. In this regard, it is instructive to examine A. Pfänder’s and E. Husserl’s philosophy of striving and willing. Pfänder’s _Phenomenology of Willing_ (1900) and the essay _Motives and Motivation_ (1911) reflect on the genesis of volition from striving. Both texts view willing as a particular form of striving that may, but does not have to, lead to action. Similarly, Husserl aims to retrace the pre-voluntary roots of willing, but unlike Pfänder, he considers willing and action to be necessarily connected. The second perspective focuses on what analytic philosophy contributes to philosophical action theory: the recognition of language’s constitutive role in determining actions. This is evident not only in terms of how we describe actions (Anscombe), but also in how we ascribe willing, intending, and acting to one another in communicative contexts (H.L.A. Hart). Therefore, a phenomenological investigation of action should be complemented by linguistic analysis. This idea is already outlined in rudiments by Husserl and particularly by Pfänder.