The semantics and ontology of dispositions

Mind 109 (436):757--780 (2000)
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The paper looks at the semantics and ontology of dispositions in the light of recent work on the subject. Objections to the simple conditionals apparently entailed by disposition statements are met by replacing them with so-called 'reduction sentences' and some implications of this are explored. The usual distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is criticised and the relation between dispositions and their bases examined. Applying this discussion to two typical cases leads to the conclusion that fragility is not a real property and that, while both temperature and its bases are, this does not generate any problem of overdetermination.

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Author's Profile

Hugh Mellor
Last affiliation: Cambridge University

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
From a Logical Point of View.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1953 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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