Not All Political Lies Are Morally Equal

Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (2):294-314 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper examines the conflict between conventional and non-conventional moral obligations by focusing on the specific case of political lies. It argues that political candidates are under a conventional obligation to try and win their election, and sometimes the most moral way to discharge this obligation involves lying. In such cases, candidates face a conflict between the conventional obligation to try and win and the non-conventional obligation to not lie. Oftentimes, candidates that face this conflict should lie because because voters, contributors, staffers and political allies all legitimately rely on that candidate to try and win. To make this point, the paper defends a framework for understanding conventional obligations that applies far beyond the specific case of political lies.

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Chris Melenovsky
Suffolk University

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