An alternative semantics for modal predicate-logic

Erkenntnis 37 (3):377 - 400 (1992)
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Abstract

The semantical framework is fundamentally intensional: neither possible worlds nor sets as basic entities, but rather, besides individuals, propositions, properties and relations (in intension). Logical truth is defined in terms of logical form (without mentioning this notion) without employing sets of models and the concept of truth in a model. Truth itself is explicitly defined (without recursion); the truth-conditions for the logical constants of the object-language become theorems derivable from the axioms for "to intend"--the basic semantical relation

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Citations of this work

Ontologically Minimal Logical Semantics.Uwe Meixner - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (2):279-298.

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References found in this work

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Logic, semantics, metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press. Edited by John Corcoran & J. H. Woodger.

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