Modality Without Reference. An Alternative Semantics for Substitutional Quantified Modal Logic and its Philosophical Significance

Abstract

This dissertation develops a substitutional semantics for first-order (modal) logic which, unlike truth-value semantics, allows a fine-grained analysis of the semantical behaviour of the terms and predicates from which atomic formulae are composed. Moreover, it proposes a nondenotational philosophical foundation for the semantics of substitutional quantified (modal) logic.

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