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Davidson and social scientific laws
Synthese 120 (3):375-394 (1999)
Abstract
This article critically examines Donald Davidson's argument against social scientific laws. Set within the context of his larger thesis of anomalous monism, this piece identifies three main flaws in Davidson's alleged refutation of the possibility of psychological laws, and suggests a collateral flaw within his account of anomalous monism as wellLinks
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Citations of this work
Intentionality, pluralism, and redescription.Lee McIntyre - 2004 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):493-505.
References found in this work
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
The myth of non-reductive materialism.Jaegwon Kim - 1989 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 63 (3):31-47.
Psychology as philosophy.Donald Davidson - 1974 - In Stuart C. Brown (ed.), Philosophy Of Psychology. London: : Macmillan. pp. 41-52.
Interpretation and Explanation in the Human Sciences.David K. Henderson - 1993 - State University of New York Press.
Psychophysical laws.Jaegwon Kim - 1985 - In Brian P. Mclaughlin & Ernest Lepore (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell.
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