Intentionality, pluralism, and redescription

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (4):493-505 (2004)
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Abstract

Donald Davidson, and others, have sometimes claimed that the subject matter of social science properly consists only of intentional actions. The author disputes this claim and explores an example drawn from social psychology that shows that some social scientific phenomena cannot be explained unless they are redescribed in nonintentional language. Key Words: intentionality • explanation • redescription • social science • Donald Davidson.

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10.1177/0048393104269197

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References found in this work

Explanation and understanding.Georg Henrik von Wright - 1971 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.

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