On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism

In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1992)

Abstract

[Why Davidson's Anomalous Monism Would Lead to Type Epiphenomenalism]: 1. According to Davidson, events can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict laws; 2. But no mental event-type is a physical event-type cited in a strict law, since the mental is anomalous. 3. Therefore, under Davidson's theory, type epiphenomenalism is true

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Citations of this work

Mental Causation.Frank Jackson - 1996 - Mind 105 (419):377-413.
Kim’s Principle of Explanatory Exclusion.Ausonio Marras - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):439-451.
Replication Without Replicators.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):455-477.

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