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On Davidson's response to the charge of epiphenomenalism
In Pascal Engel (ed.), Mental causation. Oxford University Press (1995)
Abstract
[Why Davidson's Anomalous Monism Would Lead to Type Epiphenomenalism]: 1. According to Davidson, events can cause other events only in virtue of falling under physical types cited in strict laws; 2. But no mental event-type is a physical event-type cited in a strict law, since the mental is anomalous. 3. Therefore, under Davidson's theory, type epiphenomenalism is trueAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Kim’s Principle of Explanatory Exclusion.Ausonio Marras - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):439-451.
An enlightened revolt: On the philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell.Agustin Vicente - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):38: 631- 648.
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