Authors
Aidan McGlynn
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
The orthodox position in epistemology, for both externalists and internalists, is that a subject in a ‘bad case’—a sceptical scenario—is so epistemically badly off that they cannot know how badly off they are. Ofra Magidor contends that externalists should break ranks on this question, and that doing so is liberating when it comes time to confront a number of central issues in epistemology, including scepticism and the new evil demon problem for process reliabilism. In this reply, I will question whether Magidor’s argument should persuade externalists, whether it really engages with the orthodox view on what subjects in bad cases can know, and whether the dispute is, as Magidor insists, a significant one for contemporary epistemology.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/arisup/aky011
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,008
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats May Be.C. Johnsen Bredo - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (3):225 - 249.
Of Brains in Vats, Whatever Brains in Vats May Be.Bredo C. Johnsen - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (3):225-249.
World Brains, Giant Brains and Brains in Vats.Charlie Gere - forthcoming - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences.
What's It Like to Be a BIV? A Dialogue.Michael Veber - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):734--756.
Brains in Vats and Model Theory.Tim Button - forthcoming - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Brain in a Vat. Cambridge University Press.
Brains-in-Vats, Giant Brains and World Brains: The Brain as Metaphor in Digital Culture.Charlie Gere - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (2):351-366.
Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence.Matthew Kennedy - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):77-109.
Generalizing Brains in Vats.B. Weiss - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):112-123.
Putnam on Brains in Vats.Sanford Goldberg (ed.) - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.
Generalizing Brains in Vats.Bernhard Weiss - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):112–123.
Professor Putnam on Brains in Vats.J. Harrison - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (1):55 - 57.
How Can We Know That We Are Not Brains in Vats?'.Keith DeRose - 2000 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-48.
Reply to Sawyer on Brains in Vats.H. W. Noonan - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):247-249.
Brains in Vats Revisited.S. Leeds - 1996 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2):108-131.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-06-05

Total views
101 ( #115,719 of 2,505,176 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #63,771 of 2,505,176 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes