Philosophy of Science 58 (4):523-552 (1991)

Authors
Deborah Mayo
Virginia Tech
Abstract
While many philosophers of science have accorded special evidential significance to tests whose results are "novel facts", there continues to be disagreement over both the definition of novelty and why it should matter. The view of novelty favored by Giere, Lakatos, Worrall and many others is that of use-novelty: An accordance between evidence e and hypothesis h provides a genuine test of h only if e is not used in h's construction. I argue that what lies behind the intuition that novelty matters is the deeper intuition that severe tests matter. I set out a criterion of severity akin to the notion of a test's power in Neyman-Pearson statistics. I argue that tests which are use-novel may fail to be severe, and tests that are severe may fail to be use-novel. I discuss the 1919 eclipse data as a severe test of Einstein's law of gravity
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DOI 10.1086/289639
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References found in this work BETA

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Citations of this work BETA

Identifying Logical Evidence.Ben Martin - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9069-9095.
Prediction Versus Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting.Christopher Hitchcock & Elliott Sober - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):1-34.
Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.
The Generalizability Crisis.Tal Yarkoni - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:1-37.

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Novelty and the 1919 Eclipse Experiments.G. R. - 2003 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (1):107-129.
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