When Do People Have an Obligation Not to Tic? Blame, Free Will, and Moral Character Judgments of People with Tourette’s Syndrome

Neuroethics 17 (2):1-18 (2024)
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Abstract

Tourette’s Syndrome can involve disruptive “ticcing” behavior. Past work suggests that people sometimes blame those making tics for such disruptions. In the current work, we examined how blame perceptions vary depending on the person’s obligation and capacity to refrain from ticcing. Across two studies, we manipulated whether a person ticced in a formal versus informal social situation (obligation), after a weak versus strong urge to tic (capacity). We assessed perceptions of blame, free will, and moral character. Blame increased with increasing obligation and capacity, and perceptions of free will primarily increased with increasing capacity, with perceived obligation playing a smaller role. Moral character ratings were largely unaffected by the manipulations, but people rated the person higher in moral character when their perceived obligation and capacity were low. Generally, women, younger people, and people who knew someone with Tourette’s rated the person who ticced more positively. Overall, these results suggest that whereas blame is sensitive to a person’s obligation and capacity, these perceptions do not map cleanly onto moral character perceptions, in part perhaps due to reduced free will perceptions. Efforts to normalize tics may reduce the perceived obligation to refrain, thereby avoiding both the pitfalls of blaming people with Tourette’s or viewing them as lower in free will.

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Author Profiles

Paul Conway
University of Portsmouth
Joseph Masotti
Florida State University

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