Blame and responsiveness to moral reasons: Are psychopaths blameworthy?

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):516-535 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Abstract:  Many philosophers believe that people who are not capable of grasping the significance of moral considerations are not open to moral blame when they fail to respond appropriately to these considerations. I contend, however, that some morally blind, or 'psychopathic,' agents are proper targets for moral blame, at least on some occasions. I argue that moral blame is a response to the normative commitments and attitudes of a wrongdoer and that the actions of morally blind agents can express the relevant blame-grounding attitudes insofar as these agents possess the capacity to make judgments about non-moral reasons.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,991

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
304 (#69,599)

6 months
32 (#106,130)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Matthew Talbert
West Virginia University

References found in this work

Freedom and necessity.A. J. Ayer - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 271-284.
Responsible psychopaths.Patricia S. Greenspan - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):417 – 429.

Add more references