The mystery of direct perceptual justification

Philosophical Studies 126 (3):347-373 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In at least some cases of justified perceptual belief, our perceptual experience itself, as opposed to beliefs about it, evidences and thereby justifies our belief. While the phenomenon is common, it is also mysterious. There are good reasons to think that perceptions cannot justify beliefs directly, and there is a significant challenge in explaining how they do. After explaining just how direct perceptual justification is mysterious, I considerMichael Huemers (Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, 2001) and Bill Brewers (Perception and Reason, 1999) recent, but radically different, attempts to eliminate it. I argue that both are unsuccessful, though a consideration of their mistakes deepens our appreciation of the mystery

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,642

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Against the very idea of a perceptual belief.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (2):93-105.
Unconscious perceptual justification.Jacob Berger, Bence Nanay & Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):569-589.
Knowing how to believe with justification.Steven L. Reynolds - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 64 (3):273-292.
Perceiving God.Justin P. McBrayer - 2007 - Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):17-25.
How to Be a Reasonable Dogmatist.James Vincent Pryor - 1997 - Dissertation, Princeton University
Is coherentism inconsistent?Roche William - 2011 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 33:84-90.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
24 (#155,087)

6 months
382 (#54,608)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peter Markie
University of Missouri, Columbia

Citations of this work

Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition.Zoe Jenkin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):251-298.
The Nature of Intuitive Justification.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):313 - 333.

View all 74 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Skepticism and the Veil of Perception.Michael Huemer (ed.) - 2001 - Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1991 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

View all 18 references / Add more references