Knowing how to believe with justification

Philosophical Studies 64 (3):273-292 (1991)
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Abstract

Non-propositional experiences can help justify beliefs, contrary to recent claims made by Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour. It is argued that a perceptual belief is justified if there are no undermining beliefs and it was arrived at in response to an experience through an adequate exercise of properly learned recognitional skills

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10.1007/bf00365002

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Steven L. Reynolds
Arizona State University

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