Wittgenstein's scepticism' in on certainty

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):277 – 293 (1988)
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This paper compares Wittgenstein's conception of ?objective certainty? with Descartes's ?metaphysical certainty?. According to both conceptions if you are certain of something in these senses, then it is inconceivable that you are mistaken. But a striking difference is that for Descartes, if you are metaphysically certain of something it follows both that the something is so and that you know it is so; whereas on Wittgenstein's conception neither thing follows. I try to show that there is a form of ?scepticism? in Wittgenstein's outlook on the concept of certainty, although it is not the familiar Philosophical Scepticism. The Appendix takes issue with a recent essay by John Cook which argues that the ?hinge propositions? of On Certainty are based on ?the metaphysics of phenomenalism?



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References found in this work

Philosophical grammar.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1974 - Oxford [Eng.]: Blackwell. Edited by Rush Rhees.
Philosophical Investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 4 (15):258-260.
Philosophical Remarks.Rush Rhees (ed.) - 1991 - Wiley.
Review of Wittgenstein On Certainty. [REVIEW]J. E. Llewelyn - 1971 - Philosophical Quarterly 21 (82):80.

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