In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 141-161 (2013)
AbstractThe idea that demands are a key constituent of any analysis of the negative reactive attitudes is rarely challenged, enjoying a freedom from scrutiny uncommon in philosophy. In this paper I press on this orthodox view, arguing that there are broadly speaking, three ways in which the term ‘demand’ is used in discussions of the negative reactive attitudes and that each is problematic.
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