A sneaking suspicion: The semantics of emotional beliefs and delusions

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6):719-720 (2008)
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Abstract

This commentary challenges Rogers & McClelland (R&M) to use their model to account for delusional belief formation and maintenance. The gradual development of delusions and the nature of disconnectivity in Capgras delusions are used to illustrate the role of emotional salience in delusions. It is not clear how this kind of emotional saliency can be represented within the current architecture

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