Abstract

The article offers a critical analysis Plútarchovy moral theory in the work De Morali Virtue in its historical context and monitors while the more general philosophical question: what problems they must address philosophical theory of action that is motivated by the need to prove it is a substantial difference between reason and emotion as two sources of motivation, as Plutarch sought for it in this polemic against stoikům? In the first part, the author reconstructs Plútarchovo concept with special attention to the way based on the Aristotelian framework and deviates from it. The second part shows that the rejection of Aristotle dealing with the relationship between cognitive and nerozumovou motivation and the adoption of some of the stoic nature of assumptions about human behavior theory Plútarchova slides towards stoic concept, against which it is directed. In conclusion the author based on several Plútarchových statement outlines an alternative and less vulnerable argumentative direction, which is used to Plutarch could go