The objective of the paper is to analyze the conception of virtue as represented in the book After Virtue by one of the initiators od the renaissance of the ethics of virtue A. MacIntyre. In its first part the authors examine the reasons of MacIntyre's criticism of the Enlightenment conception of morals, in which the notion of virtue was excluded from moral reflection and substituted by a universal moral principle. The second part gives a more detailed analysis of the notions (...) of practice, narrative order of a single human life and moral tradition embodying according to MacIntyre the explicative background, required for the definition of a unified notion of virtue. The reconstruction of MacIntyre's argumentation serves the clarification of why the option for Aristotelian tradition is for him the only appropriate way of grounding the ethics on a more plausible constitutive notion than that of the rule, preferred by the Enlightenment. (shrink)

The paper gives an analysis of the problem of character, which goes beyond the limits of the traditional ethics of virtue and which aims at the resolution of the essential dilemma - namely the role of determinism in the play of human fortune. The author focuses on two important French authors, whose conceptions of character were based on Kant's philosophy and on its criticism at the same time. Whereas Mounier defends the idea that the constitution of character is shaped by (...) the fundamental self-affirmation, Sartre's approach consists in accepting all the consequences of his own thesis of "the existence preceding the essence". In this context a distinctive character exists only as a transcendental meaning of every particular empirical choice. On the other hand, the author tries to show, that the understan_ding of the moral character as a dynamic form of motion oriented towards future does not keep these authors from defending certain essential tenor of a character, by which each particular decision participates in the construction of the overall picture of the concrete human being and his life objectives. (shrink)

The paper has two objectives: First, it focuses on the history of the use of the terms morality and ethics. On this background it differentiates between the understanding of morality in traditional antiquity , where these terms were seen as equivalent and defined through manners and habits, and modern conception, where the core of morality consists in duty. The question is, in which form these divergent inspirative traditions occur in contemporary ethics- and moral discourses and what are the possible resolutions. (...) The argumentation of the first part is based on Aristotle’s and M. de Montaigne’s views, whereas the second part is drawing from P. Ricouer’s project as opposed to the conceptions of M. Conche and R. Misrahi. (shrink)

The current discussion of the place of ethics in human life and of the prospectives of French ethical thinking has been given a new impulse by the tradition rooted in immanence. In this tradition the philosophy of B. Spinoza is taken as its explicit model. The paper focuses on the shift from dominating ontological problematic to ethics and on Misrahi's argumentation, which enables him to render Spinoza's ethics as subversive to the whole tradition of moral philosophy, based on the canon (...) of fear and obedience. Spinozian ethics should be grounded in the examination of human passions and desires; it should be an instrument for understanding people's actions and their highest visions. The author's question is, what consequences this interpretation might have for the contemporary understanding of morals and ethics. (shrink)

In conclusion of his Being and Nothingness Sartre articulated the problem of freedom as a moral one, promising to write a book concerning the problem. The work was published only posthumously. As a consequence of it he was reproached by his critics either for the absence of the moral problematic in his existentialism or for that in the long run the moral problem disappears . Some of them recognized his moral vision, but only in its negative form . In contrast (...) to these views the author tries to show, that the perspective of meaning and values is the core of Sartre’s phenomenological ontology, which is the necessary background of the ultimate objective of the French philosopher: a conception of morals, which would be concrete and historical at he same time. Her argumentation is based on the passages from Being and Nothingness, as well as from Sartre’s posthumous Cahiers pour un morale . A special attention is paid to problems such as the distinction between ethical anxiety and the everyday mo_rals, the spirit of seriousness, understanding man as useless passion and also the problema_tic of the motive and sense of moral conversion, articulated by Sartre. (shrink)

Concomitant to the renaissance of the concept of virtue in contemporary moral philosophy was the return to the traditional theories of virtue. The author offers a comparison of the theories of virtue with Aristotle, Spinoza and Hume, focusing on two questions: First, what do such diverse conceptions as Aristotle's eudaimonism, Spinoza's ethical rationalism and Hume's theory of moral sense have in common? Her argument is, that in spite of different principles and different conceptual means these conceptions could be covered by (...) the same moral - philosophical tradition in which that, what ought to be is not strictly separated from that, what is . Thus the good and the virtue are not seen as divergent objectives or two mutually alienated worlds - as the Kantian tradition later tried to suggest. The second question conerns some of the specific incentives of the contemporary theories of virtue, especially the concept of character and its philosophical interpretation. (shrink)

The meaning of the rehabilitation of the concept of happiness is decoded by means of the analysis of representative French ethical conceptions: the ethics of happiness of Robert Misrahi and the philosophy of hopelessness and bliss of André Comte-Sponville. It is important to take into account, that beside the conceptions follo_wing the eudaimonic tradition, there are also approaches, which revive the forgotten concept of happiness as an autonomous goodness by thematizing its opposite - the total evil. This approach is exemplified (...) by the philosophy of total evil of Marcel Conche. What all these conceptions have in common is not only their closely related intellectual sources, but also their shared methodological presuppositions. (shrink)

The main argument of the paper is, that there are two menanigs of the concept of responsibility. On one hand there is the meaning bringing the responsibility together with the idea of imputable actions and on the other hand the concept of responsibility defined through the quality of warranty. The responsibility is thus seen as related to the human behaviour as well as to the kindred and mutual dependence, which are constitutive of human relationships. The author's view is, that to (...) shed lihgt on these different menanings makes the proper understanding of what it means to be responsible posssible. (shrink)

Tha aim of the paper is to point out some of the characteristics of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as embodied in his vision of man and world and developed in his Phenomenology of Perception. The author focuses especially on Merleau-Ponty's criticism of several essential theses of J.-P. Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Merleau-Ponty tries to revitalize the bonds between those spheres of being, which in Sartre's vision are antithetical, and thus fully alienated. It should be remembered, however, that the essential problems of Phenomenology (...) of Perception have their origins in his previous work, namely in The Structure of Behaviour , in which they have been formulated independently of Sartre's vision. (shrink)

The conceptual basis of the paper is the difference between two types of responsibi- lity: the agent’s responsibility for his own acts and their effects; a responsibi- lity which is primarily oriented to the Other, about whom one is concerned and for whom one guarantees. The paper deals with this second meaning of responsibility: an imputation of a deed to somebody as its agent. The author explores the origins of the modern concept of imputation, its specific character and effectiveness, as (...) well as its limitations. She focuses on three approaches: those of M. Weber, A. Giuliani and P. Ricœur. Weber’s responsibility means a causal imputation. But it was not Weber, who introduced this way of defining the act’s ethical value. Giuliani shows, how the theological concept of imputation is related to its later laicization in the theory of natural law. Ricœur argues that the real history of responsibility began after responsibility has been separated from the theological context. In conclusion it is showed, that although responsibility rooted in one’s realizing the vulnerability of the Other differs from the responsibility of the agent for his own deeds, these are neither historically, nor theoretically two independent realms. (shrink)