Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement

In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2008)
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Michael Lynch
University of Connecticut

Citations of this work

What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.
Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.
Skeptical Arguments and Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1869-1893.

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